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The 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, caused enormous damage, particularly to
the strip of land along the Paciﬁc Ocean from the Tohoku Region to the Kanto Region, due to seismic motion and the tsunami it
triggered. This report presents an outline of the earthquake and summarizes the associated seismic damage to social infrastructure
facilities.
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Summary of the Earthquake (Japan Meteorological
Agency (JMA), 2011) At 14:46 JST (05:46 UTC) on March
11, 2011, a moment magnitude (M) 9.0 earthquake
occurred with an epicenter off the coast of Sanriku. This
was the strongest earthquake experienced by Japan since
the country began taking measurements, and the JMA
named it ‘‘The 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku
Earthquake.’’ The disaster caused by this earthquake was
given the name the ‘‘Great East Japan Earthquake Dis-
aster’’ by Cabinet decision.
According to JMA, the epicenter of the earthquake was
130 km east-southeast of the Oshika Peninsula at 381 06.2’2 The Japanese Geotechnical Society. Production and hostin
/10.1016/j.sandf.2012.11.003
g author.
ss: noda@civil.nagoya-u.ac.jp (T. Noda).
der responsibility of The Japanese Geotechnical Society.north latitude and 1421 51.6’ east longitude and at a depth
of 24 km. It was a large ocean-type reverse fault earth-
quake occurring at a plate boundary with a west-northwest
to east-southeast compression axis.
The epicentral location of the main earthquake, and that
of the larger aftershocks (moment magnitude of M 6), are
shown in Fig. 1. The largest aftershock occurred on the
same day at 15:15 off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture. On
March 9, two days prior to the main earthquake, an M 7.3
earthquake, which should be regarded as a foreshock,
occurred off the coast of Sanriku; this is also shown in the
ﬁgure. The aftershock activity of this earthquake was
extremely vigorous, namely, in the three months between
March 11 and June 11, there were ﬁve aftershocks that
were M 7.0 or higher, 82 aftershocks that were M 6.0 or
higher, and 506 aftershocks that were M 5.0 or higher.
In addition, tsunamis associated with the earthquake
were measured over a wide area, from Hokkaido to
Okinawa, mainly along the Paciﬁc side of the Tohoku
Region and the northern part of the Kanto Region, as
shown in Fig. 2 (The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunamig by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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sured at Soma in Fukushima Prefecture, of 9.3 m or higher,
and at Ayukawa in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, of
8.6 m or higher (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism (MLIT), 2011a).
Ground settlement due to crustal movement also occurred
over a wide area (Geospatial Geospatial Information
Authority of Japan (2011)). At the electronic control point
in Onagawa, extremely large crustal movement was measured,
namely, about 5.3 m in the horizontal direction and about3/11 15:08
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Fig. 1. Main earthquake and foreshock/aftershocks M6 and higher (from
a document published by Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), 2011).
Fig. 2. Measured values of the tsunami inundation and run-up (The1.2 m in the vertical direction. GSI has installed electronic
control points at about 20-km intervals in 1240 locations
throughout the country for continuous observation using GPS
satellites. It was found that after the main shock, gentle crustal
movements, that were small compared with those of the main
shock, continued to occur (see Fig. 3).2. Summary of the damage
2.1. Statistics concerning human casualties and
damaged houses
According to an announcement by the National Police
Agency (NPA) (2011), as of September 11, six months after
the earthquake, 15,782 people had died as a result of the
earthquake (including the tsunami and aftershocks), and 4086
people were still missing. The breakdown, according to
prefectures, shows that almost all of these people were in
Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures, as can be seen in
Fig. 4. In the Kanto Region, the number of deaths (persons
missing) was in the double digits in Ibaraki and Chiba
Prefectures, namely, 24 (1) and 20 (2), respectively. More than
60% of the dead and missing persons were aged 60 years or
older; many ﬁreﬁghters and police were also among the victims.
As of September 11, six months after the earthquake, the
number of houses considered to have been totally destroyed
or half destroyed were 128,530 and 240,332, respectively.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the number of houses thought to
have been totally destroyed in Miyagi Prefecture is con-
spicuously high in the breakdown according to prefectures.2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group, 2011).
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Fig. 3. Tectonic deformation by the main earthquake (from a document published by GSI(2011)). (a) Horizontal displacement. (b) Vertical displacement.
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Fig. 4. Human casualties (from a document published by National Police
Agency (NPA) (2011)).
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Fig. 5. Number of damaged houses (from a document published by
National Police Agency (NPA) (2011)).
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houses along the coast that were washed away by the
tsunami and houses along the coast and inland that were
damaged by seismic motion. In the former case, there were
many places where whole areas were destroyed. In the
latter case, there were many cases of damage due to
foundation deformation in residential land formed in hilly
areas and damage due to liquefaction on old river courses
and reclaimed land in the Kanto Region. The damage due
to seismic motion alone was relatively small, in spite of the
large magnitude of the earthquake. This is considered to bebecause the periodic properties of the seismic motion did
not directly result in damage to buildings despite the large
magnitude of the earthquake.
3. Estimated cost of the damage
An overall perspective of the earthquake damage has
still not been sufﬁciently produced, but Table 1 shows the
amounts estimated by the Cabinet Ofﬁce (2011) of Japan
as of June 24. The range in estimates in the middle column
of the table arose from the estimated rates of damage to
buildings assuming about twice as much damage in the
tsunami-afﬂicted areas as that in the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake Disaster or a substantially larger amount.
3.1. Damage to social infrastructure facilities
3.1.1. Road facilities (MLIT, 2011a)
The tsunami caused damage to road facilities, particularly
to National Route 45, which connects the Paciﬁc coastal part
of the Tohoku Region running north-south . Since the main
north-south route along the coast was closed, MLIT’s
Tohoku Regional Development Bureau (2011b) adopted a
road-opening strategy that was referred to as the ‘‘teeth of a
comb strategy.’’ The strategy was to ﬁrst open the inland
National Route 4, along the backbone of the Tohoku Region,
and then to secure road transport to the disaster-stricken
areas along the coast, like the teeth of a comb (see Fig. 6).
Figs. 7 and 8 show the damaged parts of the road
facilities on National Route 45 and National Routes 4 and
6, respectively. The main forms of damage were the
erosion of embankments at bridges ((1) Namiita Bridge:
Otsuchicho, Iwate Prefecture), road embankments washed
away by the tsunami ((2) Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture),
bridge decks washed away ((3) pedestrian bridge over a
Table 1
Comparison of estimates of damage (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011).
Great East Japan
earthquake disaster
(Cabinet ofﬁce, disaster
management)
Great East Japan
earthquake disaster
(Cabinet ofﬁce, economic
analysis)
Great Hanshin-Awaji
earthquake disaster
(MLIT)
Buildings, etc. (housing, residential land, shops, ofﬁces,
factories, machinery, etc.)
About f10.4 trillion About f11–20 trillion (due
to the difference in
estimated rates of damage
to buildings)
About f6.3 trillion
Lifeline facilities (water supply, gas, electricity,
communications, broadcasting facilities)
About f1.3 trillion About f1 trillion About f0.6 trillion
Social infrastructure facilities (rivers, roads, ports, sewage
works, airports, etc.)
About f2.2 trillion About f2 trillion About f2.2 trillion
Others Agriculture, forestry, and
ﬁsheries production
About f1.9 trillion About f2 trillion About f0.5 trillion
Others About f1.1 trillion
Total About f16.9 trillion About f16–25 trillion About f9.6 trillion
Note: Classiﬁcation of stock uses estimates of the Cabinet Ofﬁce (Disaster Management Section).
Fig. 6. ‘‘Operation COMB’’ used for opening roads(status of roads open as of 18th March) (MLIT, 2011b).
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Ohashi ((3)–(5) in Rikuzen-Takada, Iwate Prefecture), (6)
Koizumi Ohashi, (7) Sodeogawa Bridge, (8) Nijuichihama
Bridge ((6)–(7) in Kesennuma City, Miyagi Prefecture), (9)Utatsu Ohashi, and (10) Mizushiri Bridge ((9)–(10) in Mina-
misanrikucho, Miyagi Prefecture)), the collapse of slope
surfaces ((11) Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture), the collapse
of road embankments and slopes ((12) Ishinomaki City,
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Fig. 7. Damage to National Route 45 (MLIT Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 2011b).
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ture, and (14) Hirono Town, Fukushima Prefecture), etc.
On the other hand, damage was caused to a total of 20
stretches of expressways with a total length 870 km (East
Nippon Expressway Company Limited, 2011). The main
damage includes the collapse of main roads and road
surfaces at two locations, the large-scale cracking of main
roads at 13 locations, the subsidence of the road surface at
23 locations (maximum depth of 30 cm), the difference in
road surface levels of 2 cm or more at 174 locations, the
damage to bridge bearings, ﬁve bearings on three bridges,
the damage to bridge joints at 56 locations on 46 bridges,
interchange damage, and so on. There was no major
damage to bridges or tunnel structures, so by March 24,
emergency repairs were completed for about 813 km of the
above damaged stretches (about 93%). (Restoration of the
approximately 10-km section between Sendai Wakabayashi
JCT on Sendai Tobu Road and the Sendai Port North IC
and the approximately 4-km section from Sanriku
Jidoshado Sendai Port IC to Rifu JCT were completed by
March 30.) In addition, as a result of a slope collapse caused
by an earthquake that occurred at 17:16 on April 11, 2011,
with an epicenter near Hama Dori in Fukushima Prefecture,
the Joban Expressway again became impassable between
Iwaki Nakoso IC and Iwaki Yumoto IC (emergency repairs
were completed on April 14).3.1.2. River levees and coastal facilities (MLIT Tohoku
Regional Development Bureau, 2011a; MLIT Kanto
Regional Development Bureau, 2011; Japan Institute of
Construction Engineering, 2011).
Of the 12 water drainage systems managed by the
Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 1195 locations
among ﬁve water drainage systems and along nine rivers
were damaged on the Paciﬁc Ocean side. Emergency
construction was carried out to restore 29 of these loca-
tions for which the scale of the damage was particularly
large, and by July 11, all the emergency construction was
complete. On the other hand, ten rivers in four water
drainage systems managed by the Kanto Regional Devel-
opment Bureau were damaged. The damaged locations
increased with the occurrence of aftershocks, and 939
locations had been damaged as of July 31. Of these,
emergency construction was carried out to restore 24
locations for which the damage was particularly large,
and by June 2, emergency construction at all 24 locations
was complete (see Table 2).
The causes of the damage in almost all cases were the
tsunami at the mouths of the rivers and liquefaction in the
inland areas. Fig. 9 shows the positions of the major
damage along the Kitakami River drainage system and the
Naruse River drainage system in the Tohoku Region.
Also, almost all the damage in the Kanto Region was
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Fig. 8. Damage to National Route 4 and 6 (MLIT Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 2011b).
Table 2
Locations of emergency restoration of river levees under direct management. (MLIT Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 2011b, MLIT Kanto
Regional Development Bureau, 2011).
Water drainage system name No. of locations
Abukuma River 6 (Miyagi, 5)
Naruse River 9 (Naruse River, 7; Yoshida River, 2)
Kitakami River 14 (Kitakami River, 5; Eai River, 8; Shineai River, 1)
Tohoku Region 29 locations in total
Tone River 16 (Tonegawa downstream, 11; Tonegawa upstream, 1; Edo River, 2; Kokai River, 2)
Naka River 2 (Naka River, 1; Hinuma River, 1)
Kuji River 2
Kasumigaura 4 (Nishiura, 1; Sotonasakaura, 1; Hitachi River, 1; Yokotone River, 1)
Kanto Region 24 Locations in total
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was reported that in areas where countermeasures had
been taken against liquefaction, there was either no
damage or the damage was slight.
Regarding coastal facilities, major damage was caused
mainly on the southern coast of Sendai Bay, where almost
all sections of the coastal levee were either completely
destroyed or half destroyed. As a result, the major damage
consisted of the washing away of houses along the coast,
the ﬂooding of agricultural land, etc. Therefore, emergency
work was carried out to restore about 20 km at sevenlocations directly managed by the national government.
Details of this work are given in Table 3.
3.2. Port facilities
Port structures were subjected to the external forces of
the seismic motion and the subsequent tsunami. Whether
the cause of the damage was one or the other, or a
combination of causes, is not clearly known at present.
Generally speaking, breakwaters (including tsunami bar-
riers) were mainly damaged by the tsunami, and quay
27 5
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Fig. 9. Major damage locations along the Kitakami and Naruse River drainage systems (MLIT Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 2011b).
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liquefaction. Also, the effect of the tsunami on the ports in
the northern Tohoku Region was large, and the effect of the
earthquake force was large south of Ishinomaki and Sendai
Shiogama Ports. Table 4 presents an outline of the damage.
In this table, the possible causes of the damage are shown.
Normally, traces of liquefaction on coasts that have
been subjected to the effects of a tsunami are wiped out by
the tsunami, so traces of sand boils cannot be used as
evidence of the occurrence or non-occurrence of liquefac-
tion. However, it is known that liquefaction occurred to a
certain extent based on the liquefaction that occurred
during the aftershocks, as well as the many photographs
and images taken of sand boils caused by liquefaction
before the tsunami.
3.3. Railway facilities (JR-EAST)
Various types of damage were caused to the Tohoku
Shinkansen (Bullet Train), including the bending, slanting
and cracking of electriﬁcation columns, the severing of
overhead wires, damage to elevated bridge columns, the
displacement and damage of tracks, the breakdown of
transformer facilities and the falling down, tilting, detach-
ing, etc. of noise barriers. However, as a result of the
Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm System, no
Shinkansen trains operating at high speeds derailed during
the earthquake. In the main earthquake, there was damage
to electriﬁcation columns at about 540 locations. As of
April 7, restoration work at about 60 locations remained
unﬁnished; however, the aftershock on April 7 damaged
270 new locations (East Japan Railway Company (JR-
EAST), 2011b). Among these locations were locations that
had already been restored from previous damage, so a
large amount of work had to be done again.After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster,
the columns and piers of elevated bridges of the Tohoku
Shinkansen were steadily seismically retroﬁtted, so in this
earthquake disaster, there was no catastrophic damage,
such as the toppling over or the collapse of elevated
bridges, which would have lengthened the restoration
period. However, there was a very large number of bent,
tilted, or cracked electriﬁcation columns, which are ancil-
lary facilities, and because of the large number of damaged
facilities, the area’s high-speed mass passenger transport
was damaged for a long time. The main damage to the
Tohoku Shinkansen, as announced by JR-EAST, is shown
in Table 5. Also, the main damage to regular train lines
that were not affected by the tsunami is shown in Table 6.
In addition, there was signiﬁcant damage to seven local
lines that were affected by the tsunami (Hachinohe,
Yamada, Ofunato, Kesennuma, Ishinomaki, Senseki, and
Joban Lines), and 325 km of these seven lines were
damaged (JR-EAST, 2011d). The economic effect of the
disaster, as announced by JR-EAST Japan, amounted to
an estimated cost of f67 billion, excluding the lines
damaged by the tsunami (JR-EAST, 2011a).
3.3.1. Communication facilities (Oka, 2011)
Tables 7 and 8 show the scale and the cost of
communication-related damage announced by NTT East.
The damage to communication facilities from this earth-
quake is classiﬁed as follows:1) Suspension of service due to damage to or depletion of
power supply devices.2) Communication buildings damaged/ ﬂooded/ washed
away by the tsunami.
Fig. 10. Locations of damage to river levees in Kanto Region (MLIT Kanto Regional Development Bureau, 2011).
Table 3
Locations of emergency restoration of coastal levees on the south coast of
Sendai Bay. (MLIT Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, 2011b).
No. of locations (length)
Sendai Coast 2 locations (L¼2740 m)
Natori Coast 1 location (L¼3010 m)
Iwanuma Coast 2 locations (L¼6020 m)
Yamamoto Coast 2 locations (L¼8200 m)
M. Kazama, T. Noda / Soils and Foundations 52 (2012) 780–792 7873) Relay network severed by the tsunami.
4) Overhead cables to customers’ homes severed or elec-
tricity poles collapsed.
In the Tohoku Region, the effect of the tsunami was
large, while in the Kanto Region, liquefaction damage was
the main cause of the interruption of service.3.3.2. Electrical power facilities (Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry, 2011)
Of the 20 fossil-ﬁred and geothermal power stations of
Tohoku Electric Co. Ltd. (TE) that were operating, 12
stopped operating immediately after the earthquake. As a
result, the gross capacity (plant capacity) of the fossil-ﬁred
and geothermal plants was reduced by 4.926 gigawatts
(GW) (about 55%). Of the four fossil-ﬁred power stations
on the Paciﬁc Coast (Hachinohe, Sendai, Shin Sendai, and
Haramachi), three of the four plants that were operating
shut down due to the earthquake, and one shut down due
to the tsunami. The damage caused by the earthquake
included the shifting of vibration isolators, etc. In addition,
the tsunami caused major damage to coal unloaders, and it
was reported that this damage also occurred at two of the
power stations that were shut down (TE, 2011b). Of the 63
fossil-ﬁred power stations of Tokyo Electric Power Com-
pany (TEPCO) that were operating, 13 were shut down
Table 4
Summary of the main damage to port facilities (abstracted and partially summarized from a document from the Committee to Study Technical Measures
Against Tsunami and Earthquake Damage in Tohoku Ports).
Port name Area name Facility name Main damage
Hachinohe Hattaro North
breakwater
Wave-dissipating blocks moved, scouring of mounds in the port, sliding of coverings
due to the tsunami
Outer harbor Central
breakwater, etc.
Collapse due to scouring by the tsunami
No. 2 port
breakwater
Dispersal of covering blocks and split stones caused by the tsunami
Kuji Hanzaki Wave break Sliding and collapse due to the tsunami
Mizoguchi Breakwater
(north–south)
Scouring due to the ﬂow rate of the tsunami
Miyako Desaki Breakwater Sliding and collapse due to the tsunami
Shallow draft
quay, etc.
Settlement and cracking of aprons due to seismic motions
Ryujinsaki Breakwater Scouring due to the ﬂow rate of the tsunami
Fujiwara Breakwater Collapse due to the ﬂow rate of the tsunami, sliding and collapse of caissons, etc.
12 m quay
wall, etc.
Settlement and cracking of aprons due to seismic motions
Kamaishi Harbor mouth Harbor mouth
breakwater
Sliding and collapse of caissons due to the wave power of the tsunami and damage to
steel cells due to uplift of the opening caused by the ﬂow rate of the tsunami
Oofunato Harbor mouth Breakwater Sliding and collapse of caissons due to the wave power of the tsunami and damage to
steel cells due to uplift of the opening caused by the ﬂow rate of the tsunami
Nagahama,
Nonoda
13 m quay
wall, etc.
Damage to jetties and retaining walls caused by the seismic force and the level
differences with hinterland
Onagawa Tsunami barrier Sliding and collapse of caissons due to the wave power of the tsunami
Soma Main port Sea breakwater Sliding and collapse of caissons due to the wave power of the tsunami during the
drawback
Ishinomaki Hibarinocho Central wharf
quay wall, etc.
Settlement and cracking of aprons due to seismic motions
Sendaikamaishi Nakano, Koyo 12 m quay
wall, etc.
Settlement and cracking of aprons and bulging of the normal line due to seismic force
Onahama 5–6 wharf 14 m quay
wall, etc.
Apron pavement damage and crane foundation damage due to seismic force
Fujiwara wharf 12 m quay
wall
Damage to apron pavement and scour protection due to seismic force
No. 3 wharf Quay wall, etc. Apron pavement damage, crane foundation damage, and bulging of sheet piling due to
seismic force
No. 4 wharf Quay wall, etc. Damage to apron pavement and scour protection due to seismic force
No. 7 wharf 13 m quay
wall, etc.
Sliding of caissons and apron pavement damage due to seismic force
Otsurugi Wharf 10 m quay
wall, etc.
Damage to apron pavement and scour protection due to seismic force
Table 5
Main damage to the Tohoku Shinkansen (JR-EAST, 2011b).
Main damage 3/11 Main earthquake 4/7 and Subsequent aftershocks
Bending, tilting, and cracking of electriﬁcation columns About 540 locations About 270 locations
Severed overhead lines About 470 locations About 200 locations
Damage to elevated bridge columns, etc. About 100 locations About 20 locations
Displacement and damage of tracks About 20 locations About 20 locations
Breakdown of transformer facilities About 10 locations About 10 locations
Falling down, tilting, detaching, etc. of noise barriers About 10 locations 2 locations
Damage or falling down of ceiling materials 5 stations 2 stations
Shifting of bridge beams 2 locations 7 locations
Damage to bridge beam supports About 30 locations About 10 locations
Track damage within tunnels 2 locations –
Total About 1200 locations About 550 locations
No collapses of elevated bridges, bridges, or tunnels occurred.
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Table 6
Main damage to the local line (JR-EAST, 2011c).
Main damage March 11 main earthquake April 7 and subsequent aftershocks
Displacement of tracks About 2200 locations About 620 locations
Bending, tilting, and cracking of electriﬁcation columns About 1150 locations About 90 locations
Road bed ballast washed away About 220 locations 1 location
Platform deformation About 220 locations About 50 locations
Deformation of earthwork facilities such as embankments, cuttings, etc. About 170 locations About 10 locations
Breakdown of signal communication equipment About 130 sections About 10 sections
Damage to elevated bridges About 120 locations About 30 locations
Damage to station buildings About 80 stations About 20 stations
Tunnel damage About 30 locations 2 locations
Breakdown of transformer facilities About 30 locations About 10 locations
Fallen rocks About 20 locations About 20 locations
Damage to facilities where trains stop, such as overhead pedestrian bridges, etc. About 20 locations 4 locations
Severed overhead lines About 10 locations About 10 locations
Total About 4400 locations About 850 locations
Excludes damage to the 7 lines affected by the tsunami.
Table 7
Comparison of the scale of damage to NTT East (Oka, 2011).
Item Great East Japan earthquake disaster Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake disaster
Peak trafﬁc About 9 times normal About 50 times normal
(Number of mobile phone subscribers) (About 119.54 million) (About 4.33 million)
Number of lines with service interruption About 1.5 million About 285,000
Time required for restoration About 50 days About 2 weeks
Damaged equipment
Relay transmission routes About 90 routes –
Communication buildings 12 totally demolished and 16 ﬂooded –
Telephone poles About 65,000 About 3600
Pipe ducts About 3000 km About 220 km
Manholes About 2800 no. About 2650
Overhead cables About 6300 km About 330 km
Underground cables About 1700 km About 25 km
Note: Telephone poles and overhead cables: coastal damage only.Time for restoration: excludes nuclear power plant area and evacuation area. Relay
transmission routes: excludes nuclear power plant area.
Table 8
Cost of damage to NTT East (NTT East Corporation, 2011).
Loss 2010 and 2011 Emergency restoration, restoration to original condition, cost of
personnel and material support, cost of removal of damaged
equipment, making the disaster-stricken area free of charge
f40 billion yen (including a special
loss of about f20 billion in 2010)
Construction 2011- Full-ﬂedged Restoration f40 billion
Restoration for improvement of reliability a
Total f80 billionþa
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output of the fossil-ﬁred power stations (plant capacity)
was reduced by 8.475 GW (about 30%). In the three fossil-
ﬁred power stations along the Paciﬁc Coast (Hirono,
Hitachinaka, and Kashima), a total of seven units that
were operating were shut down. It was reported that in
addition to liquefaction damage, electrical equipment was
ﬂooded by the tsunami at ﬁve plants that were not
operating (TE, 2011a). Table 9 summarizes the announced
damage to electrical power facilities. The areas where
liquefaction occurred included areas along the coastlineand reclaimed land. Damage to electrical power equipment
at power stations included the exposure of foundation piles
due to the settlement of the foundation soil, the lateral ﬂow
of shore protection, the tilting of tanks and other struc-
tures, etc. Damage to electricity transmission facilities
included damage to connections in buried structures, and
the tilting, damage, and collapse of electricity poles, etc.
Fig. 11 shows the variation in the number of homes
without electricity with time within the TE area. As can be
seen from this ﬁgure, after electricity was restored to the
4.4 million homes that suffered power outages due to the
Table 9
Damage to electrical power facilities (Ministry of Economy, 2011).
Facility Tohoku electric Tokyo Electric
Hydroelectric generating facilities Dams 0 locations 2 locations
Water courses 19 locations 3 locations
Power stations 4 locations 1 location
Transformers 1 0
Isolators 0 1
Other equipment 4 1
Substations Substations 75 (9) locations 134 locations
Main transformers 90 (23) 156
Breakers 177 (171) 33
Isolators 403 (331) 268
Other equipment 917 (848) 162
Transmission facilities Damage overhead transmission lines
Damage to transmission towers 37 (37) 1
Insulators 23 108
Electrical and other cables 9 spans 115 spans
Others 221 lines —
Underground transmission lines
Cables 14 (11) 20
Pipe ducts 1 location 4 locations
Cable tunnels 0 locations 2 locations
Others 37 locations —
Distribution facilities Electricity poles (tilted, fallen over) Others 9946
Electricity poles (washed away, destroyed) 15,681
High voltage lines 20,523 locations 212 locations
Column transformers 8714 699
Overhead closers 220 18
Data in parentheses ( ) indicate tsunami damage.
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3/11 14:46
Occurrence of the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake.
Power cut to about 4.4 million homes (service area excluding Niigata pref.) 
3/12 3:59
Earthquake with an epicenter in the Chuetsu Region of Niigata pref.
No. of homes with no power: 1,313 homes within Niigata pref.
3/12 15:51 All resolved.
4/7 23:32
Earthquake with an epicenter off the coast of Miyagi pref.
Max. no. of homes with no power supply: 4,006,832 (excluding Niigata pref.)
4/11 17:16
Earthquake with an epicenter inHamadori,  
Fukushima pref.
No. of homes with no power: 204,302 
homes within Fukushima pref.
4/12 14.07
Earthquake with an epicenter in 
Hamadori, Fukushima pref.
No. of homes with no power: 5,901 
homeswithin Fukushimapref.  
Fig. 11. Variation in number of homes without electricity with time in the
TE area ((TE, 2011c), data converted into a graph).
M. Kazama, T. Noda / Soils and Foundations 52 (2012) 780–792790main earthquake on March 11, power outages occurred
again due to the aftershock on April 7. This aftershock
affected not only the electricity supply, but also other
lifelines, such as the water supply.Regarding the nuclear power stations, TE reported that
‘‘at TE’s Onagawa Nuclear Power Station in Miyagi
Prefecture, Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 3 were operating
normally, and the Unit No. 2 nuclear reactor was starting
up. When the earthquake occurred, all units automatically
shut down. The measured acceleration was 567.5 Gal’’
(TE, 2011c). At present, the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima
No. 1 Nuclear Power Station is still ongoing, and no detailed
summary of the situation has been provided. Therefore, it is
omitted from this report.3.3.3. Other lifelines (gas, water, and sewage works)
(Japan Society of Civil Engineers Tohoku Branch, 2011)
Gas is supplied in Sendai City by the Gas Bureau, City
of Sendai; the supply of gas was restored to about 310,000
homes by April 16. In the eastern areas along the coast
that were damaged by the tsunami and in hilly areas within
the city containing large-scale areas of developed residen-
tial land (Oritate 5-chome and part of Midorigaoka
4-chome), restoration had still not been achieved even
after seven months. Restoration activities were carried out
with the support of 100,000 workers from 49 gas compa-
nies from all over Japan, from Hokkaido to Kyushu,
including members of the Japan Gas Association (Japan
Society of Civil Engineers Tohoku Branch, 2011).
M. Kazama, T. Noda / Soils and Foundations 52 (2012) 780–792 791Regarding the water supply, the peak number of cities,
towns, and villages to which the water supply was cut off
was 187, and the water supply was cut off to about 2.3
million homes (survey by the Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare). In Miyagi Prefecture, there was damage to
water distribution pipes for several kilometers downstream
of the water puriﬁcation plants for the Sennan and Senen
region waterworks, the Ishinomaki region waterworks, and
the Osaki region waterworks. Also, leakage and the
separation of the joints of ductile cast iron water distribu-
tion pipes occurred (Gas Bureau, 2011).
Regarding sewage works, the end of most of the ﬂow
sewage treatment plants are located along the Paciﬁc
Coast, so they were subject to major damage caused by
the tsunami. According to the MLIT, damage was con-
ﬁrmed at 72 sewage treatment works in 12 prefectures and
the Kanto area, and as of April 6, 22 of these sewage
treatment works were still not operational. Most of the
facilities switched to a simple treatment system, and
sewage treatment is now being carried out by this system
(Japan Society of Civil Engineers Tohoku Branch, 2011).
Besides treatment problems, there have been problems
with transporting sludge, reducing the volume of sludge,
and disposal locations.
3.3.4. Liquefaction damage
The scale of the liquefaction damage caused by this
earthquake was the largest recorded anywhere in the
world, extending about 500 km along the coast from
southern Iwate Prefecture to Kanagawa Prefecture. In
the Tohoku Region, typical damage seen everywhere
included such things as sand boils, ﬂoating manholes,
tilting apartment buildings, damaged housing, the collapse
of levees, the collapse, subsidence, cracking, and irregular-
ity of roads, and the tilting of electricity poles. However, it
is considered that, in most cases, the traces of liquefaction
along the coastal areas of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
Prefectures had been washed away by the tsunami. Even in
these cases, however, liquefaction was caused by the
aftershocks, so it is inferred that liquefaction was also
caused by the main earthquake. In fact, in many places, it
was conﬁrmed that liquefaction had recurred due to the
aftershocks. In addition, liquefaction occurred even at
mine tailing dams.
In the seven prefectures that make up the Kanto Region,
liquefaction damage was conﬁrmed in 96 cities, towns, and
villages and was concentrated along the coast of Tokyo
Bay and the basin of the Tonegawa River (MLIT 2011b).
Liquefaction occurred relatively frequently in reclaimed
land, old river courses, old swamps, and drained land.
However, almost no liquefaction damage was seen in
grounds where countermeasures against liquefaction, such
as sand compaction piles, etc., had been taken.
There was a very large amount of liquefaction damage.
The damage is described in this special issue of Soils and
Foundations.3.3.5. Quantity of generated disaster waste and status of
transport (Ministry of the Environment, 2011)
As of December 13, 2011, the estimated quantities of
disaster waste in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefec-
tures were about 4.76 million tons, 15.69 million tons, and
2.03 million tons, respectively, giving an approximate total
for the three prefectures of about 22.47 million tons. In
terms of the quantity of normal waste disposed of in one
year, this corresponds to about 11 years worth of waste for
Iwate Prefecture and about 19 years worth of waste for
Miyagi Prefecture. Looking at the amounts in terms of
cities, towns, and villages, the maximum amount was in
Ishinomaki City, with about 6.16 million tons, followed by
Higashi Matsushima City, with about 1.66 million tons,
Kesennuma City, with about 1.37 million tons, Sendai
City, with about 1.35 million tons, and so on. All together,
67% of the estimated quantity of disaster waste in Iwate,
Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures has been transported
to luggage temporary debris. The percentage, according to
prefecture, is the highest in Iwate Prefecture, at 84%
(74%), followed by Miyagi Prefecture, at 64% (55%),
and Fukushima Prefecture, at 53% (47%). The values
within the parentheses represent the values as of October 4,
2011, which means that waste removal has progressed by
8–10 % in about two months. Also, the disaster waste has
been used in the construction of embankments after
conﬁrming at the sorting stage that it contained no
harmful substances in order to ensure safety and durability
(Japan Road Association, 2010).Acknowledgments
Seismic geotechnical engineering is a branch of knowl-
edge that is based on the experience gained from numerous
disasters and for which improvements are continuously
being made. As long as there is room for even a little
advancement in the methods used to date, by learning from
disasters and then moving in a positive direction with
improvements, a policy that does not allow for stagnation
in this ﬁeld of research will exist. If there is nothing new that
can be learned from the experience of the March 11 disaster,
then it seems as though we can only blame ourselves, the
engineers and researchers, for being negligent.
We have been commissioned by the Editorial Committee
to write the Preface to this special edition of the Japanese
Geotechnical Journal regarding the disaster, but it is just a
bird’s eye view of the diverse damage covering a wide area
that is difﬁcult to summarize. In the main text, we have
tried to indicate the data concerning the earthquake and
the damage it caused using numbers as much as possible.
Unfortunately, we do not think we were able to provide
enough numerical data. For further information regarding
the damage to facilities, we suggest that the readers refer to
the detailed reports which address each individual specialty.
M. Kazama, T. Noda / Soils and Foundations 52 (2012) 780–792792Finally, we would like to express our deep gratitude to
all those who have provided us with valuable information,
particularly the Tohoku Regional Development Bureau.
It is worth mentioning that this paper is based on
previous papers submitted to the Japanese Geotechnical
Journal (Kazama, 2011), has produced graphs from some
tables, and has introduced several new items.
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